

Message Text

SECRET

PAGE 01 SALT T 00111 01 OF 02 232013 Z

47

ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 CCO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 CIAE-00 INRE-00

DODE-00 /026 W

----- 005288

O P 231900 Z MAR 73

FM USDEL SALT TWO II

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1882

INFO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 USDEL SALT TWO II 111

EXDIS SALT

DOD HANDLE AS SPECAT FOR SECDEF

E. O. 11652 XGDSI

TAGS: PARM

SUBJECT: SALT: MARCH 23 MEETING

1. SUMMARY. JOHNSON DISCUSSED " ESSENTIAL EQUIVALENCE." AFTER NOTING THAT STRATEGIC MISSILES AND BOMBERS DOMINATE QUESTION OF STRATEGIC STABILITY, HE CONCLUDED MAIN BUSINESS SALT IS TO SEEK MUTUALLY AGREED LIMITATIONS ON CENTRAL SYSTEMS. HE SAID " ESSENTIAL EQUIVALENCE" CONCEPT PROVIDES APPROPRIATE BASIS FOR LIMITING STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS CONSISTENT WITH " EQUALITY" AND " EQUAL SECURITY" PRINCIPLES, WHILE RECOGNIZING PAST FORCE DEPLOYMENT AND DEVELOPMENT ASYMMETRIES. HE CONCLUDED THAT EQUAL AGGREGATES ON ICBM AND SLBM LAUNCHERS AND HEAVY BOMBERS, EQUAL ICBM LAUNCHER AND EQUAL ICBM THROW-WEIGHT SUBCEILINGS, WITH APPROPRIATE DEGREE FREEDOM TO MIX, WOULD ENHANCE STRATEGIC STABILITY AND PROVIDE " ESSENTIAL EQUIVALENCE" CONSISTENT WITH SIDES' EQUAL SECURITY. SEMENOV REITERATED NEED FOR EXAMINING ALL STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS INCLUDING FBS AND CARRIER- BASED AIRCRAFT. HE SAID REDUCTIONS INDIVIDUAL TYPES OF WEAPONS WHICH ARE ABOVE QUANTITIES ESTABLISHED IN POSSIBLE UNDERSTANDING MAY BE POSSIBLE AND USSR PREPARED DISCUSS FURTHER BILATERAL REDUCTIONS AFTER WORKING OUT MEASURES INSURING EQUAL SECURITY. HE REAFFIRMED PROPOSAL TO PROHIBIT

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 SALT T 00111 01 OF 02 232013 Z

USE STRATEGIC BOMBERS FOR DELIVERY OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS INCLUDING ASM AND ESTABLISHMENT AGREED BOMBER LEVELS. JOHNSON NOTED CONTRADICTION BETWEEN INCLUDING HEAVY BOMBERS AS STRATEGIC AND DENUCLEARIZING THEM. NEXT MEETING MARCH 27. END SUMMARY.

2. JOHNSON, ADDRESSING " ESSENTIAL EQUIVALENCE," NOTED ENORMOUS DESTRUCTIVE POWER IN SIDES' RESPECTIVE STRATEGIC MISSILE AND HEAVY BOMBER FORCES, WHICH DOMINATE QUESTION OF STRATEGIC ABILITY, SHAPE STRATEGIC RELATIONSHIP, DISTINGUISH SIDES FROM OTHER POWERS, AND MAKE FOR UNIQUE PROBLEMS IN OUR RELATIONSHIP. RECALLING SEMENOV MARCH 20 STATEMENT, HE SAID SIDES' CONTINUED INTEREST IN CURBING OFFENSIVE ARMS RACE CANNOT BE DOUBTED AND ADDED IT IS ALMOST BEYOND DOUBT THAT CENTRAL SYSTEMS POSE MOST SIGNIFICANT AND POTENTIALLY DESTABILIZING ASPECT OFFENSIVE ARMS RACE. IA RECOGNIZED THIS, BUT SIDES RECOGNIZE IA DOES NOT SOLVE PROBLEM AND GOAL IS TO REPLACE IT WITH PERMANENT AGREEMENT MAINTAINING AND ENHANCING STRATEGIC STABILITY THROUGH AGREED LIMITS ON SYSTEMS DIRECTLY AFFECTING STRATEGIC BALANCE. TASK SHOULD NOT BE COMPLICATED BY DRAGGING IN PERIPHERAL ISSUES.

3. THEN, IN ALLUSION TO SAME SEMENOV STATEMENT, JOHNSON SAID NEED FOR LIMITATIONS OF MOST POWERFUL WEAPONS IN SIDES' ARSENALS CANNOT BE REGARDED AS SPECIAL INTEREST OF ONE SIDE NOR CERTAIN " CIRCLES." NATURE OF WEAPONS THEMSELVES IMPOSES THIS NEED. HE SAW NO NEED FOR POLEMICAL VENTURES AS TO WHICH " CIRCLES" BEAR MORE RESPONSIBILITY FOR STRATEGIC ARMS COMPETITION.

4. TURNING TO " ESSENTIAL EQUIVALENCE" JOHNSON SAID CONCEPT PROVIDES APPROPRIATE BASIS FOR AGREEMENT LIMITING STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS. IN VIEW OF QUERIES ABOUT TERM' S RELATIONSHIP TO TERM " EQUAL SECURITY," HE WANTED TO CLARIFY US VIEW OF TWO CONCEPTS AND THEIR APPLICABILITY TO OBJECTIVE OF REPLACING IA WITH PERMANENT OFFENSIVE AGREEMENT.

5. AFTER CITING APPROPRIATE EXCERPTS FROM BASIC PRINCIPLES AND MAY JOINT COMMUNIQUE, JOHNSON SAID US SUPPORTS PRINCIPLES OF " EQUALITY" AND " EQUAL SECURITY" AND BELIEVES THEM APPLICABLE IMMEDIATE PROBLEMS HERE. THEY APPLY, HOWEVER, TO BROAD SPECTRUM US- USSR RELATIONS AND TASK IS TO FIND WAY TO APPLY THEM TO ACHIEVEMENT MUTUALLY SATISFACTORY SOLUTION LIMITING
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 SALT T 00111 01 OF 02 232013 Z

STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS. JOHNSON SAID US CONSIDERS " ESSENTIAL

EQUIVALENCE" CONSISTENT WITH OTHER TWO PRINCIPLES. IT PROVIDES DIRECT MEANINGFUL APPLICATION THOSE BROADER CONCEPTS TO OUR SPECIFIC TASKS. DEVELOPMENT AND UNDERSTANDING OF "ESSENTIAL EQUIVALENCE" WILL LEAD TO MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE OFFENSIVE AGREEMENT. THIS WAS PURPOSE MARCH 13 AND 16 STATEMENTS.

6. JOHNSON THEN SAID ESSENTIAL EQUIVALENCE STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS DOES NOT MEAN LEVELS AND CAPABILITIES OF EACH COMPONENT THOSE ARMS
E E E E E E E

ADP000
SECRET

PAGE 01 SALT T 00111 02 OF 02 232122 Z

72
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 CCO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 CIAE-00 INRE-00

DODE-00 /026 W
----- 005812

O P 231900 Z MAR 73
FM USDEL SALT TWO II
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1883
INFO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY

S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 2 USDEL SALT TWO II 111

EXDIS SALT

DOD HANDLE AS SPECAT FOR SECDEF

E. O. 11652 XGDSI
TAGS: PARM
SUBJECT: SALT: MARCH 23 MEETING

BE VULNERABLE, STABILITY COULD BE IMPAIRED AND INCENTIVES COULD ARISE FOR ACTIONS INCONSISTENT WITH CURBING ARMS COMPETITION. KEY ASPECT OF SALT SHOULD BE ASSURING THAT SURVIVABILITY SIDES' STRATEGIC DETERRENT FORCES IS MAINTAINED OR IMPROVED. THIS WILL ENHANCE STABILITY AND PROVIDE MEANS FOR ACHIEVING MEANINGFUL PERMANENT OFFENSIVE AGREEMENT. JOHNSON CONCLUDED THERE ARE NO CONTRADICTIONS BETWEEN PRINCIPLES "EQUALITY," "EQUAL SECURITY," AND "ESSENTIAL EQUIVALENCE." LATTER IS MORE DIRECTLY APPLICABLE TO TASK OF REACHING MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS AGREEMENT AND IS PREREQUISITE TO LASTING AGREEMENT BASED ON EQUALITY, EQUAL SECURITY, AND NO UNILATERAL ADVANTAGES.

9. JOHNSON THEN SAID THAT, TO ACHIEVE LIMITATIONS WHICH ARE CLEAR, PRECISE, AND VERIFIABLE AND PROVIDE FOR THESE

OBJECTIVES, US BELIEVES LIMITATIONS SHOULD BE FORMULATED
IN PARAMETERS OF GROSS STRATEGIC CAPABILITY, WHILE ALLOWING
SOME FLEXIBILITY IN ADDRESSING PARAMETERS IN LIGHT OF
DIFFERING STRATEGIC CONCERNS AND DESIGN APPROACHES AND
DEVELOPMENTS. US HAS IDENTIFIED PARAMETERS IT BELIEVES
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 SALT T 00111 02 OF 02 232122 Z

APPROPRIATE. ONE PARAMETER IS AGGREGATE NUMBER ICBM AND
SLBM LAUNCHERS AND HEAVY BOMBERS. THUS, US PROPOSED
ESTABLISHMENT EQUAL CEILING ON NUMBER THESE WEAPON THEY SAID
AFRICAN GUERRILLAS CAPTURED
IN RHODESIA HAVE GIVEN CREDENCE TO THIS.

3. COMMENT: WE HAVE NO EVIDENCE TO SUBSTANTIATE KAUNDA' S CLAIM
THAT MERCENARIES BEING INTRODUCED INTO RHODESIA BY SOUTH AFRICA.
IT POSSIBLE THAT SOME BLACK RHODESIANS MAY BE CROSSING ZAMBEZI
FOR LIMITED SPECIAL OPERATIONS, E. G. MINE LAYING, BUT EVEN
THEY WOULD NOT FALL WITHIN USUAL DEFINITION OF MERCENARIES.
CURRENT OPERATIONAL SITUATION IN RHODESIA DOES NOT SEEM TO HAVE
REACHED DEGREE OF SERIOUSNESS TO INDUCE SOUTH AFRICANS TO
AUGMENT THEIR FORCES IN RHODESIA, WHICH WE UNDERSTAND STILL
REMAIN AT LEVEL OF APPROXIMATELY 400 MEN. AS FOR MERCENARIES,
AT THIS POINT SAG HAS LITTLE IF ANYTHING TO GAIN BY THEIR
USE AND MUCH TO LOSE POLITICALLY IF MERCENARY CHARGE WAS EVER
SUBSTANTIATED.
HURD

CONFIDENTIAL

*** Current Handling Restrictions *** EXDIS

*** Current Classification *** SECRET

Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: Z
Capture Date: 01 JAN 1994
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: n/a
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 23 MAR 1973
Decaption Date: 28 MAY 2004
Decaption Note: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Authority: smithrj
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 28 MAY 2004
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1973SALTT00111
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: X1
Errors: n/a
Film Number: n/a
From: SALT TALKS
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1973/newtext/t19730339/aaaaiikz.tel
Line Count: 204
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE
Office: ACTION SS
Original Classification: SECRET
Original Handling Restrictions: EXDIS
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 4
Previous Channel Indicators:
Previous Classification: SECRET
Previous Handling Restrictions: EXDIS
Reference: n/a
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Authority: smithrj
Review Comment: n/a
Review Content Flags: ANOMALY
Review Date: 25 SEP 2001
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review History: RELEASED <25-Sep-2001 by elyme>; APPROVED <29-Nov-2001 by smithrj>
Review Markings:

Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
30 JUN 2005

Review Media Identifier:
Review Referrals: n/a
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
Secure: OPEN
Status: <DBA CORRECTED> srp 971230
Subject: SALT: MARCH 23 MEETING
TAGS: PARM
To: SECSTATE WASHDC
SS INFO MOSCOW
Type: TE
Markings: Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 30 JUN 2005